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As Mines Grow Old
In most cases, the mines being cleared
around the world were emplaced decades
ago; yet the techniques and equipment
being used during clearance treat them as
though they were new. The author looks
briefly at the effects of ageing on mines
and considers possible implications.
Once the wooden casing has rotted, the Russian PMD-6 can no
longer function as intended.
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I

n the early 1990s, humanitarian mine action rose to prominence
under a media spotlight, largely fuelled by sensational revelations on
the scale and nature of the global landmine problem. Among these
was the mines’ supposedly indefinite life span, along with the implication that each and every mine would eventually need to be cleared.
The plastic anti-personnel mine was the focus of attention and has
become such a powerful stereotype that the many other types are largely
ignored. The media—along with a number of technical authorities who
should have known better—created an image of a weapon that was
both indestructible and undetectable. Yet, it has long been understood
that time and environment take a toll on munitions, that a substantial
proportion of mines are not made from plastic, and that most plastics
degrade under certain conditions anyway.
In the mid 1980s—well before the term “humanitarian demining”
was coined—the British Army was struggling with the aftermath of the
mines remaining from the Falklands War. Steel-cased anti-tank mines
were visible on the tidal beaches of Yorke Bay, where the salt water soon
rendered them incapable of being defuzed safely. Meanwhile, a number
of plastic mines were found to have split open, presumably through the
action of the infamous extreme weather.
Let Sleeping Mines Lie?
The question was (and is): Were these mines still capable of functioning? If not, is it possible that entire categories of mines may, at some
point, become less dangerous or even harmless? Surely even the remotest possibility should have justified diverting a proportion of the extensive research and development effort in order to establish the facts.
The understandably conservative attitude toward safety means that
deteriorated ammunition is generally presumed to be less stable than
serviceable ordnance. This view is reinforced by a few specific examples (such as the tendency of certain explosives to form highly sensitive
secondary compounds) and the explosive-ordnance disposal principle:
when in doubt, assume the worst.
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The truth is that there has been very little formal research into the
effects of ageing on mines and other types of ordnance. There are many
instances in which it would be difficult or foolhardy to second-guess
how a munition may change, and there are many environmental factors and other variables that might prove critical. But while the issue is
largely unexplored, there are already several examples that demonstrate
the potential rewards of further investigation.
Steel Components
Perhaps the most predictable ageing effect is that ferrous components
will eventually rust if exposed to water and air. Where spring-loaded fuze
components are involved, the critical issue is whether the mechanism
will become more liable to actuation through the failure of a component
(such as a retaining pin), or seize and become completely inoperative.
In the case of a simple mechanism, such as the MUV fuze,1 the latter
appears more likely. Combined with the likelihood of foreign material
ingress (such as fine silt) around the spring and in front of the striker,
long-buried and heavily corroded mechanisms of this sort are rarely
viable. That does not make them safe, of course, but it does mean they
are unlikely to function as intended and may make them more vulnerable to certain countermeasures.
If a steel-cased mine becomes badly rusted, it may lose its structural
integrity altogether. This may, in turn, disable a fuze mechanism that relies
on the support of the casing. The main explosive charge may also begin to
crumble into the surrounding soil, the consequent loss of confinement
making the complete detonation of a cast TNT charge far less likely.
Those mines on the beach in the Falklands combine all of these elements, further heightened by the presence of fine sand, salt water and
extreme temperatures, all of which will accelerate their deterioration.
As a result, it is almost inconceivable that any of these mines are now
functional. That may not be good enough to declare the area safe, but
it should at least be a factor in the prioritisation of work and allocation
of resources.

Tripwires
Contrary to popular myth, all tripwireactivated mines are issued with metallic trip
wire; the use of fishing line and other cords
being a relatively rare form of improvisation.
With certain exceptions (such as former Yugo
slav tripwire, which is plastic-coated, multistrand stainless steel), most tripwire is soft iron
or mild steel and therefore liable to rust.
In hot, wet climates, then, the threat from
tripwires is likely to disappear within a few
years. The HALO Trust, which has worked in
Cambodia since 1992, has seen no functional
tripwires at all in recent years; with this threat
eliminated, they have started to employ handheld brush cutters to clear vegetation, significantly increasing productivity as a result.
Wooden-cased Mines
Many of the early post-war mines were
wooden-cased, with common examples (such
as the Russian PMD-61) still found in about 30
countries. With so many mine-affected regions
being tropical or sub-tropical, it is not surprising that wooden casings tend to rot. Perhaps
less obvious is the influence of insects, such as
termites, which also attack the wood. In most
examples, the wooden casing not only contains
the charge, but also activates the fuze when the
hinged lid is depressed. If the lid is absent or
completely rotten, this mechanism is disabled.

Steel-cased mines like this Russian TM-46 are
vulnerable to rust in wet conditions.

tic used and the potential effects of degradation. A worrisome development occurred
during the clean-up operation following the
First Gulf War, when there were reports of
Czech PT Mi-Ba-III1 anti-tank mines exploding spontaneously due to the degradation of
plastic fuze components.
Some fatalities were attributed to that problem, further reinforcing the impression that
degradation equates to instability, and therefore danger. While this may be true of mines
like the PT Mi-Ba-III with spring-loaded strikers retained by a brittle plastic shear mechanism, this is not always the case. As with a

Stake mines generally end up laying on the ground once the stake has rotted. Most ferrous tripwire doesn’t
last long, either.

The vulnerability of wood is also relevant
to simple fragmentation mines, which are
normally placed on short wooden stakes.
Once these stakes have rotted away, the mines
fall to the ground. The mine body is no longer
upright and anchored, so the tripwire (if still
present) will not function reliably. It is also far
safer and easier to demolish the mine once it
is laying on the ground.
Plastic Mines
As the world agonised over the indefinite
lifespan of plastic mines, few people paused
to consider the many different types of plas-

metallic mine, the breakdown of a plastic casing will normally be a good thing, so long as
the fuze retains its integrity.
The deterioration of plastic fuze components can also have positive effects. The Italian
VS-50 and TS-50 anti-personnel mines,1 copied
by Iran and found throughout the world, are
notorious for their resilient casing. However,
the ingenious blast-resistant mechanism incorporates a small inflatable bladder that perishes
with prolonged exposure to hot weather. Neither
fuze will then function fully as intended, the
VS-50 losing its blast resistance and the TS-50
effectively being neutralised altogether.

Conclusion
Findings like these are clearly significant
to demining programmes, where equipment
selection and procedures should take account
of changing mine characteristics. Particularly
startling is the prospect that some mined
areas might already be safe, while others of
low priority could possibly be fenced and
abandoned for a number of years to gradually
self-neutralise. Certification of this ground
might then be more akin to area reduction 2
than to full-scale clearance.
Furthermore, if the effects of ageing were
better understood, it might be possible to
deliberately accelerate the process. Other
benefits might include the development and
deployment of clearance equipment designed
to exploit the mine’s vulnerability. For example, the deterioration of a casing may lead to
easily detectable explosive contamination in
the surrounding area.
In summary, the deterioration of munitions, traditionally regarded with fear and
suspicion, may have the potential to revolutionise our approach to humanitarian mine
clearance. At the very least, it should be a
major factor in the prioritisation of work.
Given the existing evidence, it seems foolish
to ignore the possibilities.
See Endnotes, page 110
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